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The success of political theology as a field of study depends upon a basic ambivalence. For some, 
political theology consists in normative theological reflection upon politics, while for others it 
involves descriptive analysis of the way in which political and theological concepts influence each 
other.1 This methodological tension is a source of intellectual vitality, and it has allowed political 
theology to flourish in many corners of the university. However, those who are happy with 
descriptive analysis are often wary of normative theology. This is one dimension of the question 
that titles this symposium, “How theological is political theology?” If political theology really is 
theological, then some will conclude that it does not belong in departments of philosophy, politics, 
and religious studies. 
 Some theorists are suspicious of normative political theology because they believe it 
undermines critical rationality. Stathis Gourgouris claims that religious faith constitutes an assertion 
of certainty that excludes critique.2 Mark Lilla argues that theology subordinates rational inquiry to 
divine authority, and so it should be excluded from the public sphere.3 According to Giorgio 
Agamben, theological reflection on divine glory reinforces mundane government by neutralizing 
resistance.4 In my view, however, these theorists neglect theological traditions that resist 
dogmatism through intensified critique. Because dogmatism is a genuine danger—and not only for 
religion—normative political theology offers an important contribution to the politics of pluralist 
societies. 
                                                           
1 Of course, the division between normative and descriptive modes of analysis is unstable: description depends upon 
normative judgements, while norms rely upon an account of the way things are. Nevertheless, because this distinction 
illuminates a tension within the field of political theology, I take it that it has heuristic value. 
2 Stathis Gourgouris, Lessons in Secular Criticism (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). 
3 Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York: Vintage, 2008). 
4 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, Meridian, 
Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
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The anxiety of some theorists in relation to theology is understandable. Stathis Gourgouris 
expresses the widespread view that religious faith demands unquestioning obedience.5 On his 
account, everyday beliefs are open to critical evaluation in conversation with others, but religion 
requires submission to the divine.6 According to Gourgouris, democracy requires undetermined 
contestation, whereas theology is essentially heteronomous.7 For this reason, he concludes that the 
open space of politics must be preserved through a secular criticism that undermines appeals to 
otherworldly authority.8 
 Gourgouris is right to claim that theology sometimes functions in this way, but he is wrong 
to suggest that it always does. In fact, some forms of theology enact a circumspection that unsettles 
every claim to represent the divine. This is certainly true of Christian theology, which is the tradition 
that Gourgouris has mainly in mind.9 To be sure, there are dogmatic forms of Christianity, but there 
is also a powerful strand within Christian thought that resists closure. This openness takes a variety 
of forms, but it is expressed with particular clarity in the tradition of negative theology.10 
 Following indications in Christian Scripture, early Christian theologians such as Clement of 
Alexandria (in the second century) and Gregory of Nyssa (in the fourth) emphasized the darkness of 
divine transcendence. This instinct was given systematic expression in the fifth century by Dionysius 
the Areopagite. Where Gregory described the approach to God as an ascent into unknowing, 
Dionysius argues that this mystery requires disciplined self-critique.11 According to Dionysius, 
theology is not only a matter of affirmative speech; in his account, it requires an unsaying (in Greek, 
apophasis) that undoes everything that it says. 
 Dionysius argues that, because God is the source of every created thing, it is necessary 
both to call God by every name (because everything comes from God) and to negate every name 
                                                           
5 Gourgouris, Lessons in Secular Criticism, 72. 
6 Ibid., xiv, 50. In this paper I use the language of “religion” because it frames the debate that I am engaging, but I don’t 
intend to endorse it.  
7 Ibid., 45. 
8 Ibid., 61. 
9 Cf. ibid., 31, 36, 69, 72. Following my interlocutors, this paper focuses on the case of Christianity, but I believe the 
argument could be extended to other traditions. 
10 Thus, for instance, Rowan Williams writes, “What the narrative of Christ’s suffering does is to invite our ironic 
appreciation of the scale of misrecognition that is involved in human authority judging the divine: an appreciation that 
entails a particularly intense self-questioning” (Rowan Williams, The Tragic Imagination [Oxford University Press, 2016], 
133). 
11  Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, The life of Moses (New York: Paulist Press, 1978). 
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for God (since God is beyond everything, as its source).12 Considered as a system of predicative 
claims, this tension seems like simple contradiction, but I believe its primary function is ethical. 
According to Dionysius, people are tempted to claim privileged access to God, but every claim to 
certainty is a self-assertion that forecloses transcendence. In response to this danger, apophasis 
constitutes an ethical discipline of openness to that which is beyond oneself.13 
 In the thirteenth century Meister Eckhart argues that this self-critical practice relativizes the 
importance of Christian piety. He writes with typical vividness, “Because truly, when people think 
that they are acquiring more of God in inwardness, in devotion, in sweetness and in various 
approaches than they do by the fireside or in the stable, you are acting just as if you took God and 
muffled his head up in a cloak and pushed him under a bench.”14 According to Eckhart, the attempt 
to locate the divine in pious activities treats God like an ordinary object to be disposed of as one 
wishes. By the same token, he says, if one seeks God for the sake of securing ultimate blessedness, 
then one is not seeking God at all.15 On his view, God entirely transcends instrumental reason, 
which entails that Christian practice cannot ensure access to God.16 
 Gourgouris describes secular criticism as “the practice of elucidating the ruse of those tacit 
processes that create, control, and sustain conditions of heteronomy, that is, conditions where the 
power of real men and women is configured to reside in some unassailable elsewhere.”17 Although 
Dionysius and Eckhart operate in a different idiom, they share the same aim: for them, apophatic 
negativity functions as a disciplined reminder that Christian practice is a provisional effort that 
remains subject to revision. Their claim that divine transcendence is unknowable entails that divine 
                                                           
12 Because this tradition requires both affirmation and negation, to call it “negative theology” is somewhat misleading. I 
use that name here because it is more common than the pedantic alternative, “apophatic theology.” Nevertheless, the 
reader should consider the name negated (as well as affirmed). 
13  Where some commentators bracket Dionysian negativity by reading it as an affirmation of Christian worship, I argue 
that the two strands of the Dionysian corpus stand in tension (cf. David Newheiser, “Desacralizing Political Theology: 
Dionysius the Areopagite and Giorgio Agamben,” Modern Theology, under review). 
14 Sermon 5b, Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart, the Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, The 
Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), 183–84. 
15 Meister Eckhart, “Woman, the Hour is Coming,” printed in Reiner Schürmann, Wandering Joy: Meister Eckhart’s, 
Mystical Philosophy (SteinerBooks, 2001), 54. For more on my reading of Eckhart, see David Newheiser, “Eckhart, 
Derrida, and the Gift of Love,” in Desire, Faith, and the Darkness of God: Essays in Honor of Denys Turner, ed. David 
Newheiser and Eric Bugyis, 2015, 430–56. 
16  Where Gourgouris claims that religion asserts ultimate security, both Eckhart and Dionysius argue that one could not 
know that one is united with God (Gourgouris, Lessons in Secular Criticism, 69; Stathis Gourgouris, “Every Religion Is 
Idolatry,” Social Research 80, no. 1 [2013]: 101–28; EP 1 1065A, in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Pseudo-Dionysius: 
The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid, The Classics of Western Spirituality [New York: Paulist Press, 1987], 263; 
Sermon 52, Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart, the Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, 21). 
17  Gourgouris, Lessons in Secular Criticism, xiv. Like Gourgouris, in this essay I use “critique” and “criticism” 
interchangeably. 
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authority cannot be appropriated, nor can it be located in an identifiable elsewhere. Rather than 
foreclosing contestation, negative theology intensifies critique by calling every authority into 
question, including its own.18 
 
Some commentators worry that critique of this kind undermines the possibility of constructive 
politics. Like Gourgouris, Mark Lilla claims that theology demands submission to divine commands 
that are impervious to reason. According to Lilla, theology deforms politics by issuing prescriptions 
for the public sphere, but it is no better when it withdraws. In his view, theologians such as Karl 
Barth and Franz Rosenzweig undermine the possibility of political reflection by delegitimizing 
earthly authority altogether. Lilla writes, “If they are right, there can be no constructive political 
theology, no social blueprint to be found inscribed in scripture or in God’s created world….At 
most, their early works establish a kind of negative political theology, a critique of temporal political 
life from the standpoint of eternity.”19 According to Lilla, unrestrained critique leaves no room for 
constructive reflection upon politics in the present. 
 Where Lilla assumes that theological critique delegitimizes politics, the tradition of 
negative theology shows that affirmation can coexist with relentless negativity. Although Dionysius 
argues that every name for God must be negated, he does not conclude that Christians must stop 
speaking of God. Instead, he juxtaposes negation and affirmation in order to underscore that 
neither secures the divine. Similarly, Meister Eckhart calls into question the easy equation between 
the performance of piety and divine favor, but he does not claim that Christian practice should 
cease.20 For both Eckhart and Dionysius, the function of critique is not to foreclose affirmation but 
to render it fragile and open to the future. 
                                                           
18  I think negative theology intersects with critique as Michel Foucault describes it, as “the art of voluntary 
insubordination, that of reflected intractability” (“What Is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth [Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e), 2007], 47). If God is strictly distinct from everything else, then Christian thought and practice are human 
constructions that are necessarily fragile. (Here and elsewhere, I agree with Tyler Roberts, “From Secular Criticism to 
Critical Fidelity,” Political Theology 18, no. 8 [November 17, 2017]: 693–708.) 
19 Lilla, The Stillborn God, 276. I have responded to Lilla at greater length in “Derrida and the Danger of Religion,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, forthcoming. 
20  Eckhart’s famous line, “Let us pray to God that we may be free of God” describes a prayer, directed toward God, that 
aims to undo prayers directed toward God (Sermon 87, in Meister Eckhart, Complete Mystical Works of Meister 
Eckhart, ed. Maurice O’Connell Walshe [New York: Crossroad, 2009], 422). Eckhart writes that there is a sense in which 
“the church is a better place in the street” (“Councils on Discernment” Meister Eckhart, Meister Eckhart, the Essential 
Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, 252), although there is another sense in which it is not. 
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 This account of critique suggests that it is not only negative. Where Rita Felski describes 
critique as “suspicious reading,” Saba Mahmoud argues that critique is transformative and 
relational.21 According to Mahmoud, critique is not mainly a matter of condemning an opponent; it 
also admits that one might learn from engaging others. Indeed, as she observes, an ethical 
disposition of receptivity to others is predicated upon self-critique.22 On my account, precisely 
because negative theology intensifies critique—calling its own authority into question—it 
encourages free, florid affirmation. Rather than foreclosing heterodox perspectives, a critique of 
this kind is oriented toward the future, disrupting the familiar in order to open unimagined 
possibilities. 
 Giorgio Agamben claims that, because negative theology concerns the transcendent being 
of God, it does not address events in the world.23 In his view, the function of Dionysian apophasis is 
to sacralize ecclesiastical bureaucracy by associating it with the ineffable glory of God. There is a 
sense in which Agamben is right: the tradition that I have described does not offer direct 
prescriptions for politics. However, I think Agamben misconstrues its political implications. In my 
reading, rather than ratifying a given configuration of power, apophasis is an ethical practice that 
relativizes every authority. In this way, negative theology points to a politics that juxtaposes 
construction and critique. 
 Like religious faith, support for a political cause can harden into a dogmatic adherence that 
is impervious to other perspectives. Conversely, political movements that critique the status quo 
sometimes find it easier to resist power than to exercise it. Groups from the Tea Party to Occupy 
Wall Street demonstrate that it is difficult to pursue concrete political aims while holding those aims 
                                                           
21  Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015); Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: 
The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36–39. Constance Furey 
develops a similar argument in relation to Christian texts in “Discernment as Critique in Teresa of Avila and Erasmus of 
Rotterdam,” Exemplaria 26, no. 2–3 (June 1, 2014): 254–72. 
22  Mahmoud writes, “Critique, I believe, is most powerful when it leaves open the possibility that we might also be 
remade in the process of engaging another’s worldview, that we might come to learn things that we did not already 
know before we undertook the engagement. This requires that we occasionally turn the critical gaze upon ourselves, 
to leave open the possibility that we may be remade through an encounter with the other” (Politics of Piety, 36–37).  
23  Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 152. Agamben writes, “It is possible to analyze the notion of God on the 
ontological level, listing his attributes or negating, one by one—as in apophatic theology—all his predicates to reach 
the idea of a pure being whose essence coincides with existence. But this will not rigorously say anything about his 
relation to the world or the way in which he has decided to govern the course of human history” (ibid., 54). In my view, 
contra Agamben, Dionysian apophasis does not consist only in negation (since it is the juxtaposition of affirmation and 
negation), and it does not arrive at the idea of a pure being (since Dionysius denies that the category of being applies 
to God). The aim of apophasis is thus to unsettle any attempt to locate the divine, whether affirmatively or negatively. (I 
develop this argument at greater length in “Desacralizing Political Theology: Dionysius the Areopagite and Giorgio 
Agamben”). 
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open to revision. Insofar as negative political theology balances boldness and circumspection, it 
models a politics that affirms realistic proposals while subjecting them to unstinting critique. 
 
The answer to the question “How theological is political theology?” hinges upon what one takes 
theology to be. Paul Kahn claims that political theology today cannot take the form of normative 
theology. He writes, “We are well past the era in which theology could draw upon reason to 
support the sacred….Theological inquiry today can only be a practice of phenomenology: to 
identify and describe the presence of the sacred, wherever it appears.”24 Kahn is, of course, correct 
that most of our contemporaries will not be convinced by rational arguments for God’s existence. 
However, he is wrong to assume that this is what normative theology consists in.25 There are forms 
of theology that are neither phenomenological attempts to describe the sacred nor apologetic 
attempts to compel belief. As I have argued, theology of this kind constitutes an important resource 
for political reflection.26 
 Kahn claims that politics is founded upon imagination of the sacred, and I think he is right. 
There is reason to think that political commitments are sustained by a faith that is irreducible to 
rational self-interest. In American political life, the sacred takes various forms—from institutions such 
as the Supreme Court and the military to values like liberty and equality. These sites of sacrality 
promise a meaning that transcends the individual, which is why some find it scandalous when they 
are contested. However, as Gourgouris and Agamben observe, the sacred has an unpredictable 
power: it sometimes numbs critical awareness, and it can inspire pathological attachments that lead 
to terrible violence. In my view, negative political theology offers a compelling response to this 
danger. 
 It is not enough simply to exclude sacrality: as Kahn observes, the sacred tends to persist 
even when we believe it has been banished. Rather than affirming the sacred uncritically or 
disavowing it altogether, negative theology demonstrates that it is possible to affirm the sacred 
provisionally. Thus, Dionysius identifies the elements of Christian worship as sacred even as he 
                                                           
24 Paul W Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011), 25. 
25 See William Cavanaugh’s forceful response to Kahn in “Am I Impossible? A Political Theologian’s Response to Kahn’s 
Political Theology,” Political Theology 13, no. 6 (January 1, 2012): 735–40. 
26  For a contemporary example of political thought that draws upon theological sources, see Ted Smith’s beautiful book, 
Weird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
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desacralizes every attempt to access the divine. On this model, it is possible to hold particular texts 
and traditions as a focal point for communal identity while maintaining an ethical discipline that 
loosens their authority. 
 Although the example I have described derives from the history of Christian thought, the 
discipline it exemplifies is accessible to anyone, regardless of their own commitments. Because 
authoritarian dogma is not unique to religion, theology offers sophisticated techniques that may be 
useful for those who are not themselves religious. A normative theology that intensifies critique 
represents a valuable resource for political reflection, and not only for the faithful. 
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